Feature Third-Party Risk
TPRM Guidance Reset: The Agencies Just Called Their Own 2023 Rules a Checklist Problem
The interagency TPRM proposal names four failures of the 2023 guidance, including 'critical activities.' How to re-tier vendor risk before December 16.
Table of Contents
TL;DR
- The September 2026 interagency proposal opens by calling the 2023 guidance “overly broad,” focused on the wrong thing, and read as a checklist. It would rescind that guidance plus three supplemental resources and replace them.
- The new test is magnitude of harm × likelihood of harm per relationship. “Critical activity” stops being the trigger for full oversight.
- The comment period runs to December 16. That is also your deadline to re-tier the vendor book, because the examiners reading this will ask why your riskiest relationships still sit in the same bucket as the copier lease.
- Cutting diligence volume is the easy half. The hard half is the residual risk acceptance memo, and the contract clauses the parallel core provider statement just made adversarial.
A regulator writing a postmortem on its own guidance is rare enough to read carefully. In the Federal Register of September 15, 2026, the OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, and NCUA did exactly that to their 2023 third-party risk guidance.
The proposal says the 2023 guidance “frequently has been interpreted in an overly broad manner and with an insufficient focus on tailoring its risk management principles.” Then it lists the specific habits it wants gone: idealized examples that became de facto checklists, “should” language that read as mandatory, an emphasis on activities rather than the relationship or the harm, and an implied standard of “risk elimination, rather than risk management.”
The practical upshot: the thing most TPRM programs were graded on for three years — whether a vendor touched a listed critical activity — was the thing that made the program worse. It pushed the same 60-question questionnaire and annual on-site review at the payroll bureau and the core processor, and it consumed the exact capacity that should have gone to the four relationships that could actually break the bank.
What Actually Changes, and When
The proposal would replace the 2023 guidance (88 FR 37920, June 9, 2023) and rescind three supplements along with it:
- OCC Bulletin 2002-16, on foreign-based third-party service providers
- The July 25, 2024 joint statement on arrangements with third parties to deliver deposit products (OCC Bulletin 2024-20; SR 24-5; FIL-45-2024)
- The May 3, 2024 Third-Party Risk Management: A Guide for Community Banks (OCC Bulletin 2024-11; SR 24-2/CA 24-1; FIL-19-2024)
The agencies also invited comment on whether more documents should go. A Federal Reserve companion guide for traditional community banks, issued the same day, got its own comment-period extension to December 16.
Nothing is final. The 2023 guidance governs until a final version lands, and the proposal says non-compliance alone will not draw supervisory action and that departing from an example is not, by itself, a basis for criticism — while preserving the agencies’ ability to act on legal violations, unsafe or unsound practices, and material risks from thin management. Treat the next few quarters as a re-tiering window with a live comment file, not a controlled demolition.
The New Test Is Two Axes, Not One Bucket
Under the proposal, a higher-risk relationship is one where disruption, attack, breach, or non-business-as-usual performance could produce non-trivial legal violations, material financial harm, or significant operational disruption — and where there is material likelihood of that occurring.
Both axes. That structure is what kills the critical-activity reflex, because the reflex only ever measured one.
| Low likelihood | High likelihood | |
|---|---|---|
| High magnitude | Single-region statement printer with a tested failover and 40 years of clean SLA history. Monitor, keep the exit plan current, stop scheduling deep reviews. | Core processor, payment gateway, the KYC utility with 70% of the book on it. Full diligence, contract leverage, tested exit, quarterly concentration read. |
| Low magnitude | Copier lease, grounds crew, the design agency. Self-attestation and a renewal check. Nothing annual. | The staffing firm with 25% contractor turnover and three missed onboarding deadlines this year. Light diligence, tight SLA, monthly performance read. |
Two entries in that table have the same dollar figure and different risk. The printer and the KYC utility can both cost real money to lose for a week; only one of them is likely to be lost for a week.
Likelihood is where programs have the least data and the most prejudice. Build it from something countable before scoring: SLA breach count over 12 months, incident tickets, subcontractor changes, staff turnover in the account team, audit opinion history, and the last two years of financial signals. A starting scale of 1–4 per axis is enough — 1 is “no breach in 24 months, no sub changes,” 4 is “repeat breaches plus a recent change of ownership” — and you should recalibrate against your own incident history after one cycle rather than inheriting these anchors.
The Retrofit, in Order
Do it as a project with a dated deliverable, not as a slow re-read of the policy.
Days 1–15: full-population re-tier, mechanically. Export the vendor book and score both axes with no names attached if you can manage it. Attach an override field and require a written reason for every one — overrides are where bias shows up, especially around long-tenured vendors that “feel” safe. The output is a tier distribution and, more usefully, a list of vendors currently getting heavy oversight that land in the bottom-right cell.
Days 16–30: cut the bottom. Move administrative, clerical, professional-services, and office-support relationships to a self-attestation and renewal check. The proposal names those categories specifically as candidates for streamlined treatment, along with simplified inventories and reliance on public or alternative information. Nothing about the copier lease needs a SOC report. Write down the cut so a future examiner reads it as a decision rather than an omission, and keep the annual touchpoint to a single page.
Days 31–45: re-aim capacity. Take the hours the bottom tier releases and spend them on the top-left cell — high magnitude, low likelihood — because that is where concentration risk and exit planning live and where most programs are thinnest.
Days 46–60: affiliates and shared assessments. Contracts with affiliates inside an enterprise-wide risk framework may be lower risk, with overlapping staff as adequate oversight; the proposal says so, and it is one of the biggest real capacity recoveries available. Shared assessments, certifications, and reviews by consultants, auditors, or law firms can support diligence too — but check the review’s scope, its currency, the assessor’s qualifications, and the coverage gaps. A SOC 2 Type II covering the wrong trust services criteria answers nothing.
The Residual Risk Memo Is the Artifact
Residual risk acceptance is a named component now, not an implicit outcome. The proposal says institutions are not expected to eliminate all third-party risk and may accept what remains after mitigation, including where mitigation isn’t practicable, within appetite and tolerance.
That sounds like relief. It is actually a signature requirement with four parts, and most programs have no format for it. The memo needs:
- The specific residual exposure in operational terms — what the vendor could still do to you after the controls in place. “Pricing escalation at renewal with 11-month migration cost” is a residual exposure. “Medium risk” is not.
- What was attempted and what failed — the ask, the date, the counterparty’s answer. Contract leverage attempts should be dated, because the credibility of the memo rests on showing you tried.
- The compensating control that exists because of the gap, with an owner and a test date.
- The accept/decline authority, matched to tier. Tier 1 residual acceptance goes to a named executive or committee, not the TPRM analyst.
That file will do more for you in an exam than another questionnaire cycle. It shows judgment, and judgment is what the proposal is asking examiners to defer to.
Core Providers Got a Separate, Sharper Document
Read the Joint Statement on Community Banks’ Engagement with Core Service Providers alongside the proposal, not after it. Same day, three of the four agencies, and a markedly different tone.
It calls core provider relationships community banks’ “most material, complex, and highest-risk third-party relationships” and commits the agencies to weighing three factors when allocating supervisory attention — including exam frequency, what goes into reports shared with client banks, and whether to add a provider to the service provider examination program:
- Transparency — willingness to supply SOC reports, audit results, penetration tests, PCI DSS or ISO assessments; measurable and enforceable SLAs; disclosure of incidents; billing reconcilable to services delivered.
- Contract features — opaque pricing and billing, extended back-billing windows for retroactive charges, undefined deconversion fees (especially where the provider breached or violated law), and limits on unaffiliated vendors integrating with the platform.
- Technology — investment in current systems, responsible end-of-life management, resilience record, incident and outage history.
The statement puts the provider on notice, but the pull-through lands on the bank, because those three factors are all things you either negotiated or didn’t. If a core or critical fintech contract is up for renewal in the next four quarters, pull it now and check four clauses: change-of-control and assignment, back-billing window, deconversion fee triggers and whether provider breach waives them, and API or integration rights for unaffiliated processors. The core provider concentration analysis covers the switching-cost math behind the last two.
Answer the Comment File
The docket is open until December 16, and a bank that has done the re-tiering has something genuinely useful to file. Numbered comments beat position papers. File under one of the four dockets in the September 11 Federal Register notice: OCC-2026-0793 (RIN 1557-ZA18), Federal Reserve OP-1881, FDIC RIN 3064-ZA58, or NCUA-2026-1684 (RIN 3133-ZA54).
Four questions worth answering from experience:
- Under the subcontractor footnote, should the guidance apply only to relationships under a written agreement? Say what your fourth-party visibility actually looks like and what a written-agreement test would miss.
- How should examiners treat a bank that re-tiers a vendor down and documents the reasoning, when the 2023 guidance would have put it higher?
- What happens when a certification lapses mid-relationship — does the residual acceptance have to be reopened, and by whom?
- Should deconversion fees be capped, and at what basis: remaining contract value, migration cost, or time?
What Not to Drop
Tailoring is permissive about depth. It is silent about the four things that survive every version of this guidance: the relationship inventory, the harm-based risk assessment, the contract’s audit and exit provisions, and ongoing monitoring proportionate to tier.
Also keep the definitional discipline. “Use of subcontractors alone does not typically create an independent relationship” is not the same as “ignore subcontractors” — the fourth-party question is still asked when the subcontractor holds the data or runs the process. The vendor risk tiering method and the full onboarding and offboarding process both assume a tiered program, which is exactly the structure the proposal is trying to preserve while removing the checklist that made it unusable.
So What?
The 2023 guidance made every vendor a project. The proposal asks you to make the risky ones projects and the rest paperwork — and to write down why. Do the two-axis re-tier in the next 60 days, put a real signer on residual risk acceptance, and fix the contract clauses in any core relationship renewing this year. Then file a short comment from what you learned, because the agencies are still deciding how much deference a documented judgment actually earns, and the answer matters more than any of the specific examples.
The working file: the Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) Kit includes the two-axis tiering worksheet, the residual risk acceptance memo, contract clause language for audit, exit, and deconversion, and the monitoring schedule by tier — $69.
FAQ
Does the proposal mean lower-risk vendors need no documentation?
No. It means documentation can be lighter: self-attestation, public information, a standard contract, and less frequent monitoring — all still written down against a tier. The relationship still has to appear in the inventory with its score and its reasoning.
Who should sign a Tier 1 residual risk acceptance?
A named executive outside the vendor management function, typically the CRO or the accountable business-line head, with the operational risk committee informed. The TPRM analyst prepares the memo; they should not be the acceptance authority for a relationship that could halt payments.
Our board wants the re-tier deferred until guidance is final. What’s the argument against waiting?
Final guidance typically lands a year or more after a proposal, and examiners scope against the direction of travel now. Re-tiering is reversible — the 2023 buckets still exist — while a book with 90% of vendors in “critical” will not get cheaper to fix later. Start with the top-left cell so the first month produces concentration and exit work you needed anyway.
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◆ Related template
Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) Kit
Tier every vendor with one documented rule, run due diligence and AI vendor reviews, find contract gaps against the 2023 Interagency Guidance, and track SOC reports, issues, concentration and exits. Excel workbook, guide, Word policy and offboarding checklist.
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◆ FAQ
Frequently asked questions.
What does the September 2026 interagency TPRM proposal do?
Has the 2023 guidance been rescinded yet?
What replaces the 'critical activities' concept?
Does the proposal let a bank skip due diligence it cannot obtain?
What is the joint statement on core service providers?
Author
Rebecca Leung
Rebecca Leung has 8+ years of risk and compliance experience across first and second line roles at commercial banks, asset managers, and fintechs. Former management consultant advising financial institutions on risk strategy. Founder of RiskTemplates.
◆ Related framework
Third-Party Risk Management (TPRM) Kit
Tier every vendor with one documented rule, run due diligence and AI vendor reviews, find contract gaps against the 2023 Interagency Guidance, and track SOC reports, issues, concentration and exits. Excel workbook, guide, Word policy and offboarding checklist.
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